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Abstract 
 
The Japanese economic policy in South Sulawesi seemed to have 
different policies when compared to the other colonies in Indonesia. It 
was indicated by leadership typology of Japanese Navy which based in 
Makassar, Bukittinggi, and Java. In South Sulawesi, the policy was more 
focused on the compliance of logistic materials by strengthening on 
clothing industry, plantation of cotton and castor oil, and fisheries. The 
important policy of the army was the agricultural massive production 
sector to support the war. In addition, the agricultural and industrial 
sectors were also developed such as salt, castor oil, textile, silk, 
handicrafts and the like. Those phenomena analyzed by historical 
method. It used archives such as Japanese occupation reports in 
Makassar, Romusha archives in Makassar, and Japanese local politic 
documents in South Sulawesi. The reports on Japanese economic 
activities in South Sulawesi were also consulted. Information from 
magazines and newspapers were also taken such as Pemberitaan 
Makassar, Bintang Timoer, Sinar Baroe, Soeara Asia, Hong Po, and 
Pemandangan. In addition to, it has complied oral history with direct 
interviews to the people who are still alive and experienced on the era. 
The Japanese economic policies in South Sulawesi influenced great 
changes in new economic structure on the emergence of the 
diversification of popular-based commodity especially clothing and 
foodstuff during the war. That was the reason why people in South 
Sulawesi directed to execute intensification of agriculture in a 
professional productive manner supported by communal industrial 
policy.  
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Introduction 
The effect of war and the Japanese occupation led to comprehensive changes in 
economic structure in South Sulawesi. The main objective of Japanese invasion in 
South Sulawesi as it was to other parts of Indonesia was to explore its economic 
resources. With its fertile land and big population, South Sulawesi was considered as 
an extraordinary potential economic resources area. In such case, the Japanese took 
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advantage of the population as logistic resources (Murtono 1968). The Netherlands 
Indies was governed under the Japanese doctrin Commonwealth Environment of the 
Great East Asia which involved the whole Southeast and East Asia. The Japanese 
economic activities were led to logistic aspects where Japan became its headquarter. 
The people of South Sulawesi were insisted to support not only the Japanese military 
occupation but the military operations in a wide scale as well. The foodstuffs 
production became a priority to supply the military for the Great East Asia war. 
Although South Sulawesi had been able to be self-sufficient in foodstuff at the 
Netherlands Indies era, this condition was unable to sustain under Japanese 
occupation because there were so many productions to be encouraged as the impact of 
war (Paeni 1985).    
During the war, the commodities exchange was restricted to only the areas 
under Japanese control and this led to a great change in the ratio of supply and 
demand. In addition to foodstuff production, textile production was also given a 
priority because, in the Dutch era, Java depended most of textile supply on import. It 
was the reason why the Japanese military instructed the farmers to plant cotton, 
mulberry, rosella, and jute. Many agricultural plants such as tea, coffee, and 
sugarcanes were replaced with core plants since there was no more marketing value 
and at the same time, they had overproduction. This condition made the farmers had 
no option to plant any commodity on their land. The government strictly restricted 
the land to cultivate and it reminded us the forced plantation system in the century 
(Sutter 1959). 
At the end of twentieth century the Dutch government by Pax Nederlandica 
developed economic integration by creating the center of economic growth in every 
region. In East Indonesia region, it was based in Makassar while South Sulawesi 
became foodstuff barn of Netherlands Indies which was supported by policies that 
encouraged the economic growth at the outside of Java (Kurasawa 1993). Many 
irrigation facilities were developed in South Sulawesi such irrigations in Bila, Bengo, 
Leworang, Palakka, Tempe, Sidenreng, Tallo, and Jeneponto. These irrigations had 
increased irrigated rice fields from 20,500 acres to 57,000 acres in the early 1936 and 
at the end of 1936 to 227, 193 acres. Such increment gave impact on the increase of 
rice export rate from f. 300,000 to f 3,300,000. During the Japanese occupation, the rice 
production decreased because of many irrigation facilities were malfunctioned and 
caused the rice export rate lower down to f 2. 7000.000 in 1943 (Indische Verslag, 
1943: 344). 
 
Method 
This is a historical research using archives sources either in manuscript forms or 
interviews particularly in associated with economic policies in agricultural sectors 
(namely: cotton plantation, the salt industry, and fishery) and their implementation 
in the areas occupied by Japanese naval government. This research used 
interdisciplinary approach such as historical and economical approaches based on 
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documentary archives sources and interviews on community figures which played 
roles in the era of Japanese occupation in South Sulawesi. 
The primary data were taken from the collection of The Library and Archives 
of South Sulawesi in Makassar. The data included documents on Sulawesi Province, 
documents on East Indonesia State, reports on Japanese occupation activities in 
Makassar, Romusa activities in Makassar, local politics during the Japanese 
occupation in South Sulawesi, brief notes on trading activities in East Indonesia State. 
The data were also taken from the Indonesian Nasional Archives in Jakarta 
included Gouvernement Secretarie, Inventaris van het Archief van de Algemene Secretarie 
en Het Kabinet van de Gouverneur General 1944-1950. These two documents contain 
Besluit (stipulation) about trade policy in Makassar and also economic and political 
conditions. In addition to such documents, the writer also used oral history to make 
deeper analyze on the problems (Portelli 1991). It is recorded interviews cassette by 
M. Saleh Lahade, Riri Amin Daud, Kawilarang, and others. 
Data in published archives materials at Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-Land-en 
Volkenkunde (KITLV) in Leiden, Koninklijk Instituut voor De Tropen (KIT) in 
Amsterdam and at Indonesian National Library in Jakarta were also consulted. Data 
in books, journals, and newspapers about Makassar as a trading city were also 
included. Enomische Berichten Oost Indonesia 1949; The Economic Review of Indonesia 
Vol. 1 1947, Vol. 6 1952. Center for Statistical Bureau entitle, data on export-imports in 
several major ports during 1947-1958 all were consulted. The magazine entitled Berita 
Ekonomi 1951-1956, Mingguan Tempo Doeloe which contained information on South 
Sulawesi economy after independence.   
 
Economic and Financial Policy  
In a short time, Japanese military controlled most of Southeast Asia region and other 
East Asia.  There was a notorious slogan of Japanese military” The God wind makes 
all the dry leaves fly. Sinar Baroe with this slogan the Japanese military occupied the 
area instantly (Sinar Baroe, 25 Juli 2065). With unpredictable powerful military troops, 
they invaded every state they passed through without any resistance. The Japanese 
military reached Indonesia lastly where Manado was the first to be occupied 
followed by other regions such as Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Sumatera, Java, and Jakarta.  
No one could argue that the expansion of Japanese occupation to Asia and 
Pacific regions needed a great expenditure on materials, natural and human 
resources and because of this situation, and for fundraising, the Japanese military 
established some efforts in economic sectors to finance the expensive war. The 
Romusha (forced labor) system was implemented in the whole hinterland areas. 
Such mobilization of the people was not only conducted by the military itself 
with the slogan colonialization release of Great Asia, but it was also done national 
movement figures who directly encouraged the people to support the war done by 
Japanese Military (Dai Nippon) (Soeara Asia, 18 Mei 2064). 
Another way to enhance the economic activities to finance the war was to do 
promote economic policy that emphasized the maximum exploration of natural 
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resources. With this exploration of natural resources gave impact on massive 
agricultural products in most of the areas controlled by the Japanese military. Such 
products were rice, second crops, corn, etc. The important policy of Japanese military 
was massive production on commodities that supported the war such as cotton, 
rubber, and castor-oil plant project for alternative energy, especially for the airplane. 
The Japanese made propaganda not only in political aspect to make Great Asia 
free from colonialization but also an economic aspect as well. At the wartime which 
was more and more became dreadful, the war that also involved Indonesia, the 
economic sector became very crucial to back up the military in order to win the war. 
The progress of education in South Sulawesi under Japanese naval government 
let to the establishment of schools and an increasing amount of pupils. For example, 
there were 3791 people elementary schools with 2.375.600 pupils (Sinar Baroe, Djoeni 
2604). In addition, there was coffee and tea plantation movement together the 
intensification of foodstuff materials such as rice, corn, and tuber. This program was 
under the supervision of Juyoshokuryo Kanri Jimusho (The Main Foodstuff Supervision 
Office) who was also given the charge for marketing, storage and setting up the 
price. Obviously, the economic condition at the wartime was bad in relation to the 
price rises in the trade sector. The price of daily needs of the people increased 
significantly high (especially for cigarette raised to two folds). The price of 
toothbrush raised from 30 cents to 50-85 cents, white thread from 1,5 cents to 4-71,5 
cents, white shirt from 125 cents to 250-275 cents, 1-yard white cloth from 14 cents to 
40-45 cents (Soeara Asia, Januari 2064). 
To dominate Netherlands Indies economy, the Japanese prime minister 
designed the economic development program for the common wealth. He said that 
the majority of people in Great East Asia would become a priority in the 
development of forestation, agriculture, and fishery to equalize the industrial sector.  
Some efforts had been done to distribute the foodstuff based on people needs.  
At the meeting of People Representatives of Tokyo at 28-01-2603 (1943) Okinori 
Kaya, a Japanese Ministry of Finance delivered his speech on fiscal policy to the 
council. According to him the Japanese economy is good and the finance is sufficient. 
The southern area would be developed and the economic relationships among the 
Japanese ally was also satisfactory. In order to win the Pacific war, the economy had 
to be strengthened. The Japanese economic policy was merely directed to win all 
aspects and to avoid the distortion of government activities to satisfy this condition, 
some aids for economic empowerment were given as the following; a) improving 
people health 78 million yen; b) people security control 130 million yen; c) armed 
forces management 155 million yen; d) Improving education 150 million yen; e) 
improving science and technology 61 million yen . 
The revenue from iron mining taxation and coral was about 9,995,000,000 yen. 
The gain from income tax was 6,580,000 yen. In the meantime, the national saving 
was increased and the people were pleased to support the government. This made 
the tax was easily collected and the bonds were quickly sold. The diversification of 
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new taxations added the income to 1,140,000,000 yen yearly (Sinar Baroe, Januari 
2064). 
The Japanese expenditure was well managed where pound were easily 
collected, New bonds were sold to the public at the rate above 3,000 million yen.  
Since the war of Great East Asia was won by Japan, its economic condition became 
powerful. The economic relation of Japan in Asia indicated by the cooperation of 
Mantjoekoeo and Tiongkok in improving the economy. Poen Thai and Indo-China 
empowered Japanese labor. On the other hand, Japan gave aids its allies to improve 
their economy. Last year Japan invested 100 million yen in Mantjoekoeo and 
Tiongkok.  
To enhance the wealth of Japan, the Japanese government made the new 
strategy for developing economy by making an agreement with its allies in Europe. 
Such agreements were: Developing New Economy, Highly appreciation for His 
excellence Gunseikan. To empower the economy in Java, Keizal Singikai (Economic 
Investigation Board) held the meeting to make the economic program for colonized 
areas on June 12, 1943, in Tyuucu Hookookaikan Djakarta.  
The speech of His Excellency Gunseikan emphasized that the Dutch 
colonialization policy for centuries didn’t make economic prosperity for Indonesian 
people. In order to improve the economic condition for the ever last prosperity of 
Indonesian people, there should be designed the basic development to bring 
Indonesian independence eventually. 
The Japanese army designed a new economic structure based on the concept 
and idea of Netherland Indies economic goals by the establishment of the committee 
on the preparation for new economic people structure called Zyuumin Keisai Sintaisai 
Zumbi Inkai. This committee was also given charge to investigate the preparation of 
independence and designed the fundamental economic development as the basis for 
state establishment. During the war, there were three sectors in economy done 
consist of the increasing production rationally, collecting goods for government to 
fulfill war logistics; and distributing goods evenly to people. 
In connection with the enemy landed in Tarakan and Balikpapan, and his 
further target was Sulawesi, the civilian navy of Japan strengthened the economy in 
the islands in order to protect Sulawesi from enemy attack. This protection could be 
done since the Japanese military during three years of his control had made the 
commodities overwhelming and military equipment, as well as the defense, were 
powerful. 
 Only in two-week of occupation, when the government set the price of the rice, 
30% of them were given to government and day by day increased.  In addition, the 
cooperation with Indonesian people, corn plantation, fishery, and seabird catching, 
freshwater fishery all were done successfully.  
In Sulawesi, the weaving machine had been being prepared in order to be self-
sufficient in clothing. This program was directed in South Sulawesi to continue the 
battle for self-determination to have independence. To support the South Sulawesi 
economy, some rules for popular crediting had been issued on July 2, 1943 as 
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follows; a) people Bank established in major cities in South Sulawesi; b) each local 
bank owned capital at the amount of f100.000 or above and if this capital is lower 
than this amount, the local government will suffice; c) the local people banks are 
obliged to give loan to the people and pay them by installment based on the time set 
up, provide capital for credit  institutions run by people and handle deposit as well 
establishing other banks; d) people Banks may not  use their extra money unless they 
purchase shares determined by the government; e) people Banks will cooperate with 
rural banks which will be established at various sites (Sinar Baroe, Jumat 27 
November 2062). 
These rules were not yet understood by many merchants in the era of Japanese 
occupation. They said the rules were not published and communicated. Although 
there was a barn to raise the price, many merchants raised their goods price or they 
collected as many goods as possible and sold them when they had the expensive 
price. Anyhow, some merchants were arrested because of they against the rules. 
When they were caught before leaving Jakarta, they were not accused of collect 
trading goods proportionally and make price control in disorder (Soeara Asia, 7 
Djoeni 2604). Purchasing goods irrationally depended on whether such goods traded 
legally or not. A merchant was said to against the rules when they bought the thing 
in the black market with illegal price.  
 
Japanese Policy in Foodstuff Plantation 
During the Japanese occupation, the cultivation of agricultural land in rural areas was 
agreed by the majority people to maximize rice production. During the Japanese 
occupation, the slogan “multiple folds of production” was implemented everywhere. 
This concept was communicated by the government at the meetings with community 
and published in various media. 
With fertile land and huge manpower, South Sulawesi had a good condition for 
planting rice and by the end of Dutch period, south Sulawesi produced about 4 million 
tons a year.  There were 3, 4 million acres of rice fields in 1940 or equivalent to 42, 7% 
of the whole land in Sulawesi. However, since lack of technology, fertilizer, and fund 
to develop irrigation facilities, the plantation was done traditionally and brought about 
lower production. The average of harvest per acre in 1938-1939 was 1500, 3 kilograms 
of pounded rice or about 40% of Japanese production.at the same year. The variety of 
rice production in South Sulawesi depended upon local conditions. 
There were three main rice producers in South Sulawesi such as Pare-pare, Bone, 
and Bonthain. Whereas the areas where lower rice productions were Mandar and 
Luwu. There was also production variety per capita where Pare-pare was the highest 
(345 kg) and the lowest was Bone (46 kg) (Sinar Baroe, 20 July 2065). 
Although an increase of foodstuff production became a crucial program by the 
military government in the early of its occupation, this program needed a clear 
implementation just after November 1943 when the government made constitution 
called Kinhoji Sibokuoya Taisaku (Urgently Actions on Foodstuff Materials). With this 
program the government rules on increasing production were focused on a) 
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introducing new rice variety; b) innovation of plantation technology; c) enhancing 
agricultural infrastructure; d) rice field expansion; e) propaganda and training for 
farmers. As the consequence of intensification program, there was no more land for 
cultivating particularly in Java. On the other hand, Japan had a high technology and 
experts which they wanted to transfer to Javanese farmers through those aspects 
mentioned above.  
 
The Policy on People Salt Industry 
Salt was considered important for it could not be replaced by other materials. Salt is 
our daily need besides rice. Salt is people property and so is rice to sustain their lives. 
This property may not be seized by the government but it should be maintained for 
maximum supply (Sinar Baroe, Jum'at 3 Juni 1942). How was the stock of the salt? 
In the colonial government era, the stock of salt was arranged to fulfill the 
supply for five years. However, it had never been effective. The salt was produced by 
the government for one year between 100 and 300 thousand tons while the 
consumption was 300 thousand tons. Just in the years before the Second World war, 
the salt production got a little increase even the Japan adopted forced work 
(Romusha). The decrease of salt production in Madura was a clear indication when at 
the end of Japanese occupation, the principal of salt industry executed suicide 
because he was afraid and ashamed to welcome the Saiko Sikikan visit. As the 
anticlimax of salt famine was the cancelation of salt monopoly in April 1945. 
By the early years of Indonesian republic government (1945, 1946 and 1947), the 
salt production in Madura even decreased lower to around 10% of the consumption. 
The decrease of this production was caused by lacking manpower in (Madura 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 1947). The salt industry that had employed 20,000 
manpower, employed only 5.000 manpower. In addition to this salt famine, the 
transportation of salt in the land as well as in sea was also difficult.  Meanwhile, the 
Japanese colonial government also canceled salt monopoly. The only way to 
overcome salt famine was to instruct all people who lived at the seashore to make 
salt. This policy was supported by the establishment of extension office of people 
salt. 
 The opportunities were well received by the people along the seashore at 
Jeneponto and Mandar. In making salt, the sea water was dried in the small pond 
and this resulted in form of white crystal with contained at least 80% NaCl. Salt 
industries employed thousand hundreds of people living along the seashore. Most of 
them had their own ponds, hired or were given by the government. For example, 
Jeneponto produced around 50 thousand tons in 2013.  
It is obvious that salt industry which was done by people could guarantee an 
adequate stock to overcome salt famine. The government of Indonesia Republic who 
took over sovereignty from the Dutch still practiced salt monopoly. On the other 
hand, salt industry in Yogyakarta and Rembang were carried out although it collided 
with monopoly and this made the situation unfair. 
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It does not matter whether the salt monopoly as colonial inheritance, was 
directed to finance the state. Anyhow, it is worthy to study further who will get 
benefit nowadays: the state or the people. Whether or not the salt monopoly be 
maintained? 
 
Cotton Plant Plantation 
In Dutch occupation era, the cotton productions were still low. In 1937, the plantation 
land was only about 4000 acres with raw cotton productions were around 6500 tons. 
Meanwhile, the consumption in Netherlands Indies were around 91 000 tons. This 
means that there was only around 7 percent supplied by domestic production and 
the rest were imported. Cotton wool which was imported for the whole Netherlands 
Indies in 1939 was 13, 772 tons and cotton materials were 62,089 tons (Indische Verslag 
1940: 344). By the time the Japanese occupied Netherlands Indies, cotton production 
was considered important. It was the reason why the plantation of cotton plants was 
urgently done and even importing cotton was quickly realized. Japanese government 
brought 3 million meters of white cloth and 5 million meters of gauze from Tokyo in 
October 1942 until March 1943 (US Department of Commerce 1963). However, there 
was no data whether or not such amounts were fulfilled. It was impossible to satisfy 
that lots since the shipment were very difficult because of the war in Great East Asia. 
The Japanese military government announced a five-year plan to intensify 
cotton production in 1942 with a target of 350,000 kg and an area of 2500 acres. In 
1943, the target raised to 7,000,000 kg and an area of 30.000 acres. In 1944, the 
productions were 130.00000 kg with an area of 50.000 acres. In 1947 the productions 
reached 50.000.000 kg with a planting area 180.000 acres (Sinar Baroe, 7 Juli 2063; 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 1947). 
The five-year plan for planting cotton in Java and Sulawesi was carried out by 
collecting equipment, technicians, establishing a board named Mengka Saibai Kyokai. 
In December 1942 land had been prepared to be cultivated by various firms under 
the cooperation with some of the appointed local governments.  
As the consequence of this program, the local government felt very difficult to 
get seeds and as the result, most of the seeds were imported from abroad particularly 
from Japan. Fortunately, under the aids of the Japanese navy, some thousands of 
“Express” seeds variety were brought to us from Sulawesi. In May 1943, thousands 
of seeds had been planted in thousands across in Sulawesi and Java. 
A threat to the cotton plantation in hot land in South area came from the cotton 
pest. To eliminate such pest, the technicians of the firms controlled the coming pests 
and killed them to reduce their attack. There was also sort of bumblebee pests in 
Bantaeng and Bulukumba with the local name Kilanka. In Malang existed other pests 
but they all could be killed with pesticide materials and by catching them. The pests 
attack happened when cotton plants started to bloom and at this time the pest should 
be destroyed. Generally, plant maintenance was said to be successful although it was 
not totally perfect. In addition to this pest, there were also weeds which the Japanese 
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called them Hamasuge. These weeds grew rapidly so they needed a lot of manpower 
to pull them up.  
Another factor which affected the cotton production was the weather. 
Fortunately, the weather condition in 1943 was much rain compared to the previous 
years. That was why the cotton plants that were planted in December had an extra-
long branch. In contrary to Java and Sulawesi island, the Philippines and Taiwan 
where there were often attacked by storm, Java and Sulawesi islands almost had no 
storm during the cotton plantation. This situation resulted in appreciation to cotton 
plantation firms in Java and Sulawesi eventually (Sinar Baroe, 2063). 
Because of price determination, oc cotton produced in Java influenced the 
cotton plantation firms eventually, and this condition had been well considered by 
the government. Nowadays cotton price which had been set up by the government 
as the following a) class 1. Rp 18 per 100 kg; b) class 2. Rp 16 per 100 kg; c) original 
variety in Makassar Rp 13 per 100 kg. The prices based on the purchasing places 
according to each area, the price determination involved the costs of plantation so 
that the farmer eventually could establish their own firms (Sinar Baroe, 2063). 
 
Castor-oil Plant Plantation 
In the meeting of Nomuka representative, he said that of all war equipment, an 
airplane is said to be vital to win the war in Great East Asia. Castor-oil contributed as 
a source of energy to win the war. Castor-oil seeds produce oil which can be used as 
fuel for the airplane. The atmosphere of Sulawesi is good to plant castor-oil seeds. 
How far the contribution of castor-oil seeds to war arms could be indicated that 
every 280 castor-oil trees were able to fly a bomber airplane 20 hours long or 
equivalent to 14 trees per hour. For training airplane, it needed only 4 trees for an 
hour flight.   
In addition, castor-oil with Java variety could deliver more yields until 20,000 
fruits per one tree (Post 1991). A thousand of good quality castor-oil fruit weighted 
50 gr whereas the common quality weighted only 35 grams. An average tree could 
yield 400 grams and when this amount was distilled, it could result from 180 grams 
of oil. 
Other plants to be obliged to farmers were castor for lubricating oil. Before the 
war, South Sulawesi had a limited production especially in Gowa, Bontain, 
Bulukumba, and Bone, this production was only around 10.000 tons. At that time, 
there was 30% of castor oil exported by South Sulawesi to Japan. This oil was 
particularly used as the lubricating material for airplane machine and since the war, 
the need for this oil by Japanese army increased rapidly. Japanese military 
government in Makassar tried to increase castor oil production. He set up the target 
from the amount of 40,000 tons in 1943 to rise up to 60.000 tons in 1944. To satisfy this 
target, a great campaign had been started since 1942 and to be continued during 
occupation time (Sinar Baroe, 2063). 
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Weaving Cotton Cloth in South Sulawesi 
In addition to farms, spinning and weaving cotton were also encouraged in rural 
areas. Training and courses for spinning were carried out by every level of 
government. For example, in Bone and Sinjai regencies, there were two 
representatives of Fujinkai from every district sent to regency capital city and trained 
for three months in 1944. This training was sponsored by Hokokai and Fujinkai at 
regency branch offices led by regent’s wife. The trainees stayed at the boarding house 
near a regent office.  They learned how to extract the raw cotton fibers from its seeds 
(kernels) and span them into cotton fibers. After training, they went back home and 
executed the same training at the district level. The trainees at this level came from 
every village. The tools used in training to extract and spin the cotton were provided 
by the government. The costs for training, food, and accommodation of the trainees 
were provided by Hokokai. 
In Malino, Gowa Regency, some schools of cotton spinning existed 
permanently. With these courses, the technique of spinning cotton had been 
mastered by rural people. As the result, many householders ran this business. With 
the cotton fibers they produced, the householders started to weave and activated the 
traditional weaving tools (Chaniago 1985). Before the war (1941) there were many 
hands weaving tools for industry in the hinterlands area of Buginese. With the 
Japanese support, weaving as home industries developed in many areas in South 
Sulawesi. They made their own tools imitating the tools provided by the 
government. In many cases, the scale production of weaving was small and just for 
satisfying the need of the family. They, however, probably sold one or two pieces of 
their productions if there were a surplus or they needed cash for expenditures. 
According to H. Ambo in Sinjai, one could sell a piece of sarong weaved by 
hand in the black market with the price of 400 kg rice equivalent. One piece of sarong 
took four days to weave. Because of its lacking, the cloth could be used as media of 
exchanges or barter.  It was estimated that a piece of sarong needed 300 grams of raw 
cotton while this amount was harvested in two square meters of land. 
Spinning and weaving as the home industry in Maros were carried out in every 
area.  With this condition, the shortage of cloth could be overcome for a certain level 
after 1944. The skill of farming, spinning and weaving in rural people then 
revitalized under Soekarno regime with the slogan Berdiri di Atas Kaki Sendiri 
(Berdikari: self-sufficient), and manual weaving machine made in Japanese 
occupation were reused and given name as woven non-machine or Alat Tenon Bukan 
Mesin (Sinar Baroe, Selasa 7 Juli 2043) 
Regardless this home industry, raw cotton that was sold to Japan lastly were 
given to spinning manufactures controlled by the government. The total productions 
of cotton fibers and cloth at the end of occupation were cotton fibers 171.600 
pounds/month, wide cloth 270.000 /month, and narrow cloth 2.830 pieces/month. 
Other textile materials which were encouraged by Japanese authority included 
hard fibers such as hemp, jute, rosella, and mulberry (Berita Ekonomi, 1954: 17-19). 
Hemp and jute were put in priority since these materials had fibers relatively soft 
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and could be made clothing material as well bags for agricultural products. All 
farmers who have interviewed complaint about lacking cloth and gunny sack for 
shorts in Japanese occupation.  
In the Dutch period, eight millions of gunny sacks were produced a year 
although this amount satisfied only 35% of the demands and the rest of it should be 
imported from India. Since the import was stagnant, Japan had to satisfy their needs 
and in June 1942 through the intensification program called Nanpo Ko-Niki Asarui 
Zosan Keikaku Yoko in Ko area, Southeast Asia. This program was designed by 
Planning Bureau (Kikakuin) of Japanese Government. Based on this program, there 
were 81 productions targeted for Rosela and gunny sack between 1942 and 1947. 
With good natural condition and energetic people, the cotton plantation in the 
whole Sulawesi had started and given good prospect. It was hoped that in the next 
five years the production became multifold. According to the report written by an 
expert that the weather and land, either in the whole region of Sulawesi were more 
suitable for cotton plantation. 
 
Conclusion  
This study is about economic policy and its implementation in the area where 
Japanese navy governed especially in South Sulawesi. The existence of Japanese 
government in South Sulawesi at Second World War seemed to have two major 
interests. Firstly, Makassar was made as a center maritime fleet of the Japanese navy, 
and secondly, South Sulawesi was driven to empowering the war logistics. These 
two aspects gave impacts on the type of strategies in political and economic policies 
implemented in South Sulawesi. This was quite different in paddy-field, where 
people were directed to be Romusha and labors in various sectors of mining and 
plantations. Whereas in South Sulawesi, Japanese was more cooperative with local 
kings, related to economic development. Not only was the different type and policy 
characteristics based on the individual area but also the characteristics of the 
population became the main consideration for policy implementation. In addition, 
there was also a polarization between Japanese army and navy in Java. Such 
polarization was interesting to study in order to get a deeper understanding about 
the history of Japanese occupation in Indonesia, especially in South Sulawesi during 
the war period i.e., decolonization period and the replacement of Dutch regime to 
Japanese occupation. The way of Local kings fought against the Dutch seemed has 
affected the local king’s attitude to be loyal to the Japanese government. In fact, this 
research is supposed to correct various researches done by historians and other 
scientists who were concerned to the dynamics of Japanese local history in Indonesia 
and who were tended to equalize Java and outside Java. 
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